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The Stolper-Samuelson theorem: evidence from congressional voting patterns on CUSTA, NAFTA AND GATT Comercio e integración en las Américas

By: Beaulieu, E | IICA, San José (Costa Rica) | Universidad de Costa Rica, San José (Costa Rica) | BID, Washington, D.C. (EUA) | INTAL, Buenos Aires (Argentina) | Coloquio Académico de las Américas San José (Costa Rica) Mar 1998.
Material type: ArticleArticlePublisher: San José (Costa Rica) AGROAMERICA 2000Description: p. 121-136.ISBN: 92-9039-441-2.Subject(s): EUA | POLITICA DE COMERCIO EXTERIOR | POLITICA ECONOMICA | COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL | NAFTA | GATT | MODELOS | | | | | | | | ETATS-UNIS | POLITIQUE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL | POLITIQUE ECONOMIQUE | COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL | ALENA | GATT | MODELESummary: This paper addresses three important questions of US trade policy that are relevant to Latin American countries. First does the political economy of trade policy unfold differently when it involves trade between two similar countries, as oppossed to two differently endowed countries? Second, is the political economy of multilateral trade policy different from the political economy of regional trade agreements? Third, are the economic interests represented by legislative voting patterns independent of constituent industrial composition and therefore consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem? The Stoper-Samuelson Theorem predicts that economic type of factor owernship (i.e. skilled and unskilled labor, capital and land). These questions are addresses by empirically examining congressional rollcall voting patterns on the CUSTA, NAFTA and GATT implementing legislation. This paper analyses the cross-sectional voting patterns and financial contributions of congressional representatives merged with census data on constituent characteristics to examine whether the representative's voting decisions reflects the economic interests of constituents. Although there have been several studies examining the determinants of congressional voting patterns on various trade bills, there have been no attemps to examine whether voting patterns on trade legislation observed on the floor of the United States congress reflect political cleavages predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson congress reflect political cleavages predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. (MV)
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This paper addresses three important questions of US trade policy that are relevant to Latin American countries. First does the political economy of trade policy unfold differently when it involves trade between two similar countries, as oppossed to two differently endowed countries? Second, is the political economy of multilateral trade policy different from the political economy of regional trade agreements? Third, are the economic interests represented by legislative voting patterns independent of constituent industrial composition and therefore consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem? The Stoper-Samuelson Theorem predicts that economic type of factor owernship (i.e. skilled and unskilled labor, capital and land). These questions are addresses by empirically examining congressional rollcall voting patterns on the CUSTA, NAFTA and GATT implementing legislation. This paper analyses the cross-sectional voting patterns and financial contributions of congressional representatives merged with census data on constituent characteristics to examine whether the representative's voting decisions reflects the economic interests of constituents. Although there have been several studies examining the determinants of congressional voting patterns on various trade bills, there have been no attemps to examine whether voting patterns on trade legislation observed on the floor of the United States congress reflect political cleavages predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson congress reflect political cleavages predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. (MV)

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